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COMMENT
PROBLEMS IN THE PROVISION
OF PUBLIC GOODS
DAVID FRIEDMAN*
I. COMMENTS ON TIE-INS AND THE MARKET PROVISION OF
COLLECTIVE GOODS
My comments on Daniel Klein's article' are divided into two
sections. The first discusses whether there is any important dif-
ference between providing a local public good, such as a patrol
service, by means of a tie-in contract and providing it by means
of a government. The second discusses difficulties with Mr.
Klein's private solutions to the problem of providing pure pub-
lic goods-and similar difficulties with governmental solutions
to the same problem.
A. When is a Government not a Government?
A developer buys a large area of land, builds houses, streets,
and sewers, and converts several acres into a small private park.
Before selling the houses, he draws up a contract by which the
purchasers agree to pay an annual fee for maintenance of the
common facilities, patrol services, and the like.
Because the developer cannot be sure of the future cost of
gardening, road repair, or patrol services, he is unwilling to
guarantee to provide them for a fixed price. The purchasers are
equally unwilling to give him a blank check to spend as much as
he wants at their expense. The obvious solution is to set up a
residents' association, empowered to raise and lower member-
ship dues and to decide how that money is to be spent. Every-
one who purchases a house agrees to join the association and
to be bound by its decisions. The charter of the association
specifies the voting rules by which it will make its decisions.
This is a common solution to the problem of providing local
public goods, and it may well be a satisfactory one, but in what
sense is it a private solution? One of the main points of Mr.
* Associate Professor, A. B. Freeman School of Business, Tulane University; Faculty
Fellow, University of Chicago Law School.
1. Klein, Tie-ins and the Market Provision of Collective Goods, 10 HAR.J.L. & PuB. POL'Y
451 (1987).
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Klein's article is that tie-ins provide a non-governmental way of
producing collective goods. Is not the residents' association,
with compulsory membership, compulsory dues, and demo-
cratic voting rules, simply a local government under a different
name? Will it not face exactly the same sorts of problems in
running its community-bureaucracy, rational ignorance, cor-
ruption, rent-seeking-that make government seem, to many of
us, an unattractive and inefficient mechanism for producing
goods and services?
The moral philosopher, or at least the libertarian moral phi-
losopher, might reply that the essential difference is an ethical
one. Governments come into existence by something very
much short of unanimous consent, and impose their rules and
their taxes on everyone living in the area they claim, whether or
not he has agreed to accept them. The members of the resi-
dents' association all voluntarily agreed to join it and abide by
its rules when they purchased houses in the development. If the
association is equivalent to a government, it is equivalent to the
only kind of government with any real claim to moral author-
ity-one established by unanimous consent.
The economist is likely to give a somewhat different answer.
The residents' association, once established, is exactly like a
government. The one essential difference is that the process by
which it was established will tend to create an efficient govern-
ment, insofar as that is possible.
Consider all of the forms of government that the develop-
ment could have, each defined by its constitution-voting rules,
organizational structure, bylaws, and the like. Typically, differ-
ent constitutions will produce different outcomes. The devel-
oper, in choosing a constitution for the residents' association,
will look for the set of rules that maximizes the total value for
which he can sell the houses he has built. If-and this an impor-
tant qualification-the purchasers are able to evaluate the effect
on them of alternative constitutions, the one that maximizes
the developer's profit will also be the one that maximizes the
net benefit to the purchasers.
What each consumer is buying is a package containing both a
piece of property and the benefits and liabilities of membership
in the residents' association. The price he is willing to pay will
be the amount that he believes the bundle is worth. A change in
the proposed constitution that produces net benefits-for in-
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stance, by changing the expected outcome in a way that makes
the owner of house A $2000 better off and the owner of house
B $1000 worse off-will also produce a gain for the developer.
After changing the proposed constitution, he can raise his price
for A by $2000, lower his price for B by $1000, and be better
off by the difference. The developer will try to construct an op-
timal constitution for the same reason that he will try to con-
struct optimal houses-any net improvement will raise the
price for which he can sell his goods by more than it raises his
costs, hence will increase his profits.
That conclusion depends on the assumption that the con-
sumers know what they are buying. The more ignorant they
are, the greater the difference between the house or constitu-
tion that maximizes the developer's profits and the one that
maximizes net benefits to the purchasers. As in the case of ordi-
nary private goods, consumers can help solve their information
problem by listening to a range of producers and, perhaps
more important, examining a range of products. 2
So one argument in favor of the "private" solution to the
problem of producing local public goods is that, though it does
indeed produce a government, the government it produces is
one that has been designed by someone in whose private inter-
est it is to produce the best possible government. How much of
an advantage this is over the "public" solution to the same
problem depends on how well ordinary governments are
designed. The public choice literature suggests that one can
expect government to have an efficient constitution only if (1)
transactions are costless3 or (2) the constitution is adopted
unanimously.4 Satisfying either of those conditions is unrealis-
tic. In sum, though both the private and the public solution re-
2. Note that similar problems face a voter trying to decide what constitution to vote
for, he, however, has much less reason to try to solve them. One voter's correct deci-
sion increases the vote for the correct constitution by one. Unless the community is
very small, the result is only a very slight increase in the chance that the correct consti-
tution will win. On the other hand, a consumer choosing among communities knows
that his choice will determine which community he will live in, hence which constitution
he will live under.
3. Assuming zero transaction costs, residents will bargain among themselves to
reach an efficient constitution. See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1
(1960).
4. Under most circumstances, for reasons similar to those discussed in my comments
on David Schmidtz's article Contracts and Public Goods, 10 HARv. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 475
(1987), a requirement of unanimous assent to the constitution will result in no consti-
tution at all, unless transaction costs are zero or at least very low.
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quire unrealistic assumptions to work perfectly, the public
solution requires much more unrealistic assumptions and so
seems likely to produce a worse approximation to the ideal
outcome.
So far, we have been talking about the constitution for a
community. Very much the same analysis applies to a similar
case with which many readers may be more familiar-the rules
of a corporation. A corporation, like a government or a resi-
dents' association, requires a set of decision-making rules for
decisions made by and on behalf of its members.
Under current law, some of the rules binding corporations
are produced by the courts and the legal system, and some are
produced by the corporations themselves at the time of incor-
poration.5 With regard to the latter set of rules, the newly
formed corporation is in the same position as the yet unsold
development. It has no stockholders (residents) to exploit.
Before investing their money, both stockholders and residents
have an opportunity to evaluate the effect on themselves of the
decision rules to which they are agreeing. Corporations with
rules of which potential stockholders approve will be able to
sell their stock at a higher price, just as developments with
rules of which potential residents approve will be able to sell
houses at a higher price. Hence existing corporations are, at
least in part, designed for efficiency in the same way as the
communities that Mr. Klein discusses. In both cases, the out-
come can be expected to be efficient in the sense of solving the
organizational problems at least as well as any alternative ar-
rangement. It may be argued that this is one of the reasons that
even very large corporations seem to produce output at a much
lower cost than do governments.
6
B. Can Tie-ins Solve the Hard Problems?
In Parts I to V of his article, Mr. Klein shows how tie-in sales
can be, and are, used to produce a wide variety of public goods.
5. Since partnerships with many partners existed before corporate law, the privately
generated rules must have been at least sufficient for a workable organization, although
not necessarily either optimal or identical to the rules of modern corporations.
6. A second reason has been pointed out by Judge Winter. Our present corporate
law is the outcome of a competitive legal process; states, led by Delaware, compete to
design corporate codes that corporations will choose to be chartered under. This is an
example of how something we usually think of as a public good-a set of legal rules-
can be converted into a private good and sold. See Winter, Private Goals and Competition
Among State Legal Systems, HARV. J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y., Special Issue 1982, at 127.
508 [Vol. 10
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In Part VI of the article, he argues that the same solution may
solve the hard problem of how to produce a pure public good
with a large public.7 The example he gives is national defense,
which many would regard as the most fundamental responsibil-
ity of government, and the one most difficult to provide
privately.
His first suggestion is that communities-presumably propri-
etary communities-may require, as part of the purchase agree-
ment, that residents agree to contribute to defense if necessary.
The difficulty, as he notes, is that communities that do not have
such requirements will free ride on those that do.' He suggests,
and very briefly describes, ways in which social sanctions might
deal with such problems.
Suppose that, for whatever reason, there are no pre-existing
defense contracts. Mr. Klein suggests that defense may then be
funded by individuals, motivated by the threat of sanctions.
Thus, for example, all grocery stores might refuse to deal with
customers who had not made their "voluntary" contribution to
the defense funds.9
There are some serious difficulties with that solution. It will
have no effect unless enough stores join so that the cost im-
posed on customers-travelling to a "scab" store, getting fake
evidence of having made defense payment, or the like-is at
least as great as the amount each customer is expected to con-
tribute for defense.10 Suppose that is the case, and further sup-
pose the sum of those expected contributions to equal a
thousand dollars per capita.
A store that chooses to break the boycott-to agree to sell to
customers whether or not they have contributed to defense-
will find that it can raise its prices by the equivalent of almost a
thousand dollars per customer and still get lots of (non-con-
tributing) customers. Hence a store that adheres to the boycott
is, in effect, reducing its profits by about a thousand dollars per
customer times the number of customers it can serve. Added
up over all stores, that means that the grocery stores are reduc-
ing their profits (relative to what each could get by violating the
7. See Klein, supra note 1, at 471-73.
8. See id. at 472.
9. See id. at 472-73.
10. Strictly speaking, the limit will be the amount required for defense minus the
value to the customer of the additional defense provided by his contribution.
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boycott, not necessarily relative to what each got before the
problem of defense arose) by an amount roughly equal to the
full defense expenditure of the society. That may, if the grocers
are sufficiently patriotic, be a satisfactory way of defending the
society, but it is not an example of the production of a public
good via a tie-in sale.
Mr. Klein's answer, if I understand it, is that a store that
breaks the boycott may itself be the object of sanctions-
"blacklisting and boycotts."1 The most obvious objection is
that the store in question is selling only to those who have not
paid for defense-and they are hardly likely to boycott it for
doing so. More generally, here as earlier, Mr. Klein is falling
back on the assumption that an unexplained and unanalyzed
set of social sanctions will somehow solve the public good
problem for him. He may perhaps be right, but the claim is
outside of his analysis-which, unfortunately, does not provide
us with any solution to the sort of pure public good problem
exemplified by (non-local) national defense.
C. Public Provision of Public Goods: The Unsatisfactory Alternative
Mere powder, guns, and bullets,
We scarce can get at all;
Their price was spent in merriment
And revel at Whitehall,
Our King and Court for their disport
Do sell the very Thames! 
1 2
The Dutch in the Medway, Rudyard Kipling
One point that Mr. Klein might have made is that the inabil-
ity to solve such problems privately does not imply that they
can be dealt with any better publicly. Public provision of na-
tional defense solves one problem-free riding by those who
would not pay contributions but are compelled to pay taxes-
but it replaces it with another.
In order for public provision of the public good of national
defense to work, the money must not only be collected, it must
be spent-on defense. More generally, once one has an organi-
zation-the government-that is empowered to compel people
11. See Klein, supra note 1, at 473.
12. R. KIPLING, The Dutch in the Medway, in RUDYARD KIPLING'S VERSE: DEFINITIVE
EDITION 727-28 (1940).
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to pay for something whether or not they want to buy it, one
has the problem of how to control that organization. Not only
must it be controlled in order to make it use its power to pro-
duce public goods, but it must also be controlled in order to
keep it from using its power to enrich itself, or those control-
ling it, at the expense of the rest of us. That appears, from both
historical evidence and theoretical analysis, to be a nontrivial
problem.
From the standpoint of public choice theory, the problem is
simply another version of the public good problem. Control-
ling the government-making it do the right things-is a public
good. If I spend my resources, whether of time or money, in-
ducing the government to do good, most of the benefit will go
to other people. If I spend the same resources inducing the
government to steal from my neighbor and give the loot to me,
any resulting benefit goes entirely to me. That is true whether
the resources are spent on planning coups under a dictatorship
or on becoming a well-informed voter under a democracy. In
each case, the benefits produced by political action for the gen-
eral good are very widely dispersed, so it is unlikely to be in any
individual's interest to take such action.
We started with the pure public good problem of getting the
entire population to contribute money (or time) to produce
the public good of national defense. We "solved" it by estab-
lishing a government authorized to collect taxes and spend the
money on defense. We are left with the pure public good prob-
lem of getting the entire population to contribute time (or
money) to produce the public good of making the government
do those things, and only those things, for which it was
established.
We are better off to the extent that the cost of our new public
good is less than that of the old. The per capita expenditure in
time necessary for voters to become sufficiently well informed
to make a democractic society work well enough to defend it-
self may well be less than the per capita expenditure necessary
to produce national defense. We are worse off to the extent
that in creating a government that can do one desirable thing-
defend its society-we have also created a government that can,
and (judging by the historical record) will, do many undesirable
things-the prevention of which is also a public good.
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It follows that the public good problem is not only a power-
ful argument against a society in which all goods, including
those normally produced by government, are produced pri-
vately. It is also a powerful argument against all of the obvious
alternative societies, including the one in which we live. It is
interesting to imagine, in an alternate history in which North
America had developed into the sort of society that Mr. Klein
describes, an alternate Professor Samuelson developing the
theory of public goods in order to demonstrate the complete
unworkability of any proposal for governmental solutions to
the society's problems.
II. COMMENTS ON CONTRACTS AND PUBLIC GOODS
The heart of David Schmidtz's argument, and the part that I
find most interesting and most in need of criticism, is his dis-
cussion of five different sorts of public good problems, and
possible private solutions to each. My comments are organized
accordingly.
A. Cases One and Two
Of the five cases that Mr. Schmidtz discusses, the first two, as
he makes dear, do not involve the full public good problem,
because individuals either do not want to free-ride or cannot.
In case one, 13 every member of the public is assumed to receive
a net private benefit from contributing: The sum of his direct
benefit from his contribution to the good plus "fringe benefits"
(such as the knowledge that he is being a good citizen) is larger
than the cost of his contribution. Hence it is in each person's
interest to contribute, no matter what anyone else does. 4 The
good is public, but the problem has been assumed away.
In case two,' 5 the good is excludable, so there is no public
good problem. The good could be produced, as Mr. Schmidtz
suggests, via a conditional contract (or "CBAC"-"condition-
ally binding assurance contract"), but there seems no good rea-
son why it should be. The usual way of producing such a good
13. Schmidtz, supra note 4, at 486-88.
14. The conditional contract is necessary only because the author also assumes that
the individuals concerned will not get the benefit of feeling like good citizens unless
their fellow citizens are all good citizens too. Without this assumption, FB would ap-
pear in the bottom left-hand corner of Figure 5, as well as in the two right-hand cor-
ners, and contribution would be the dominant solution. See id. at 487.
15. Id. at 488-90.
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is for an entrepreneur to raise the necessary money, produce
the good, and sell it. 6
B. Cases Three and Four
Case three' 7 involves a real public good problem and a real
solution-a unanimous conditional contract."8 Unfortunately,
though that solution may work for producing some public
goods, it has serious difficulties for many others.
One source of problems is imperfect information. As Mr.
Schmidtz points out, a unanimous contract conditional on
every member of the public's making the same contribution
will fail if, for some members, the value of the good is less than
its per capita cost. If everyone's value for the good were public
knowledge, the entrepreneur drawing up the unanimous con-
tract could simply allocate contributions to members of the
public in proportion to how much each valued the good. As
long as the total value of the good was greater than its total
cost, it would be possible to raise enough money to pay for the
good without charging anyone more than he was willing to pay.
In most real-world cases, however, my value for the good is
known only to me. The entrepreneur can, of course, ask me.
But if I know that my contribution will be proportional to my
stated value, I have an incentive to lie. If I persuade the entre-
preneur that the public good is worth nothing to me, he will
leave me off his list, and I can free ride on everyone else's
contributions.
That is but one example of a difficulty that Mr. Schmidtz
16. Because the cost of producing the good (a vaccine) is the same regardless of how
many people consume the good (get vaccinated), the good is a natural monopoly. That
introduces another efficiency problem, which the author does not discuss. If different
consumers have different values for the good, the total value may be greater than the
total cost, but there may be no price at which the producer can cover his costs. At a low
price everyone buys the good, but some people pay much less than it is worth to them;
at a high price, those who have only a low value for the good drop out of the market. In
this situation, unless the producer can recognize the high and low value consumers and
sell the good to them at different prices, the good will not get produced. This point is
discussed at considerable length in D. FRIEDMAN, PRICE THEORY: AN INTERMEDIATE
TEXT 375-83 (1986).
17. Schmidtz, supra note 4 at 491-93.
18. This solution is discussed at some length in D. FRIEDMAN, THE MACHINERY OF
FREEDOM: GUIDE TO A RADICAL CAPrrALISM 185-97 (1978) (chapter 34) and D. FRIED-
MAN, supra note 16, at 417-19. For an Eighteenth Century example of a conditional
contract for the production of a public good, see B. FRANKLIN, The Autobiography of Ben-
jamin Franklin, in I THE WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 376-79 (A. Smyth ed. 1907).
It appears that in addition to inventing the Franklin stove and demonstrating that light-
ning is electricity, Benjamin Franklin also invented the matching grant.
No. 21
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does not consider-strategic behavior. There are others that
come to mind. Consider again his case three, where the public
good is medical research and everyone is known to value it
equally. Suppose that I am both stingy and stubborn. As soon
as I learn that a conditional unanimous contract is being con-
sidered, I go to the entrepreneur drawing it up and tell him to
leave me off the list of contributors. If he does not, I will refuse
to sign and the contract will fail.
I would be better off signing the contract, paying my share of
the public good, and getting the good than I would be refusing
to sign, not paying, and not getting the good-but those are
not the only two alternatives. If I persuade the entrepreneur
that I am unwilling to sign, he will leave me off of his list and
collect the necessary funds from less unreasonable members of
the public. I will then get the public good without having to pay
for it.
In this case, the crucial question is who is more stubborn-
or, in the more usual language of such analysis, who can better
commit himself to future action. If the entrepreneur can some-
how commit himself not to produce the good unless everyone
pays, I will find it in my interest to back down. If I can somehow
commit myself not to pay, it is in the entrepreneur's interest to
back down and arrange to produce the good without me.
In more realistic cases, the problems of imperfect informa-
tion and strategic behavior reinforce each other. Individuals
who want to get out of paying will claim a low value for the
good. The entrepreneur may suspect that some or all of them
are lying, but have no way of knowing which. If even one per-
son whom he insists on putting on the list for his conditional
unanimous contract really does not want the good, the contract
will fail. Even if he guesses correctly, some who want the good
may still refuse to sign, in the hope that a second and successful
attempt to produce the good will be made-with their names
left off the list of contributors.
Whether such problems prevent the good from being pro-
duced will depend on the size of the group and on how much
information is available about the value of the good to each
member. It will also depend on the difference between the total
value of the good and the total cost. If the good is worth $1
million and costs only $1000 to produce, the entrepreneur may
be able to limit his list to those he is sure want the good, charge
514 [Vol. 10
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each of them only a tenth of his estimated value for it, and still
collect more than enough to produce the good. If, on the other
hand, the good is worth $1 million and costs $900,000 to pro-
duce, the entrepreneur will succeed in producing the good only
if he does a very good job indeed of drawing up the contract
and bargaining with members of the public who are trying not
to pay their share.' 9
That is true not only for the simple public good of cases
three and four, but also for the compound public good that is
Mr. Schmidtz's solution to case four.20 Even if one can put to-
gether a package of public goods that everyone values at about
the same amount, doing so will not eliminate strategic behav-
ior. Each person, after all, will prefer a different package-one
containing more of the public goods he values and less of those
he does not. Because many different packages are possible,
each person has an incentive to refuse to contribute to the par-
ticular one proposed, pressuring whoever is assembling the
package to assemble a package more to his liking. If even one
member of the public uses that strategy, the contract fails.
C. Case Five
In dealing with case five,2' Mr. Schmidtz combines two dif-
ferent arguments. The first involves comparing alternatives X,
Y, and Z in Figure 12.22 The second adds an element of time to
the problem, allowing the individual to wait until he sees what
others have agreed to contribute before he decides, at the last
instant, to either contribute or withhold. I will try to show why I
find both arguments unsatisfactory.
1. X, Y, Z: All Alternatives Are Not Created Equal
In choosing whether or not to contribute, the individual in
case five faces a problem of decision under uncertainty. He
does not know whether he is in situation X, Y, or Z, yet which
situation he is in will determine the costs and benefits of con-
tributing. He is thus in the same situation as a gambler choos-
ing a strategy based on his estimate of the probability of
19. The relation between size of the public, value and cost of the good, and
probability of producing the good is discussed in more detail in D. FRIEDMAN, supra
note 18, at 185-97 (chapter 34) and D. FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 417-19.
20. Schmidtz, supra note 4, at 493-95.
21. Id. at 495-99.
22. Id. at 496.
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different outcomes-which card will be dealt next, or what the
next roll of the dice will be. Like such a gambler, he will try to
maximize his expected return-to get the best outcome "on av-
erage," where the average is weighted by the probabilities of
the different alternatives. 3 Hence his decision will depend on
the respective probabilities of the alternative situations (X, Y,
and Z) and on the associated gains or losses from contribution.
In situation X (others fail to contribute) the decision to con-
tribute has no effect, in situation Y (the individual's contribu-
tion makes the difference between success and failure)
contribution produces a benefit for the individual, and in situa-
tion Z (the good will be produced even if the individual fails to
contribute) the individual's contribution is unnecessary, so he
is worse off by the amount of his contribution (C) minus any
marginal increase in the value of the good due to the additional
money he is providing (P). It follows that the desirability of
contributing, from the standpoint of the individual, depends on
the relative probabilities of situations Y and Z and the relative
size of the associated gains (benefits minus contribution, or T -
C) and losses (C - P).
Unfortunately, in almost all public good problems except
those involving very small publics, situation Y is enormously
less probable than situation Z, so it almost never pays to con-
tribute. To see why that is the case, consider national defense
for a small country. There are a million and one citizens; the
cost of national defense is $100 million per year. To allow for a
certain percentage of the citizenry who will refuse to pay, each
citizen is asked to contribute $150. The contributions will be
returned if the total is less than $100 million.
The outcome is described by a probability distribution. For
the sake of simplicity, assume that the average contribution of
the population (not including me) is uniformly distributed be-
tween $99 and $101.24 In other words, the total amount offered
has an equal chance of being anything between $99 million and
$101 million. Situation Z occurs if the total contribution of eve-
ryone else is at least $100 million; the probability of that is .5.
Situation Y occurs if the total contribution of everyone else is
23. For the sake of simplicity, I assume the individual is risk-neutral and is therefore
concerned only with maximizing the average of the monetary value of the different
payoffs. More complicated assumptions are possible, but add little to the analysis.
24. Consider the analogous case of predicting the outcome of a presidential elec-
tion. A polling service accurate to within k 1%6 would be doing quite well.
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less than $100 million and at least $99,999,850; only in that
situation will my $150 contribution make the difference be-
tween failure and success. The probability of that is
150/2,000,000 = .000075.
I will take the gamble of contributing only if the probability
of situation Y times the net benefit to me of contributing in
situation Y (my gain if I contribute in the hope that situation Y
holds and win my bet) is at least equal to the probability of
situation Z times the net cost of contributing in situation Z (my
loss if I contribute and lose). In other words, in order for it to
be worth betting (contributing), the gain if I win my bet times
the probability of winning must be at least as great as the loss
from betting times the probability of losing. In this particular
case, that requires that the benefit to me of being defended be
equal to about $1 million per year.
The problem here is that situation Y, in which contribution
pays, only occurs if the outcome is exactly on the knife-edge
between success and failure. It is analogous to an election's be-
ing decided by a single vote. Except in very small elections, that
is phenomenally unlikely. In my example, the population is rel-
atively small, defense is considerably cheaper (per capita) than
it is for the United States at present, and the assumed
probability distribution is a very tight one. In other words, the
assumptions have been chosen to favor the outcome that Mr.
Schmidtz wants. Nonetheless, defense will not be produced.
One can imagine situations-with a much smaller public, very
predictable behavior, or a public good worth enormously more
than it costs-in which the opposite conclusion would hold, but
it is hard to believe that they represent a significant part of the
government activities commonly defended as producing public
goods.
In trying to argue that the individual who believes but does
not know that he is in situation X will choose to contribute,
even though he may turn out to be in situation Z, Mr. Schmidtz
says: "[Although his investment may have been unnecessary, the
CBAC's success still yields him a very nice profit of T - C. He cannot lose
by contributing. "25 That last sentence is wrong. If the investment
was unnecessary, he would have gotten T without making it, so
he is losing C, the amount of the contribution (minus any im-
25. Schmidtz, supra note 4, at 499 (emphasis added).
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provement in the public good due to the extra money spent on
it). Mr. Schmidtz is confusing the gain from having the public
good produced (T, which is positive) with the gain from con-
tributing to a public good that would be produced anyway (P -
C, which is negative).
Readers who find Mr. Schmidtz's argument convincing may
want to consider the following analogous situation. After an ex-
tensive search, you find an automobile dealer who has the
model you want. The salesman offers, in exchange for a $100
bribe, to make sure that the car is not sold while you arrange
for a bank loan. You want the car and do not want to have to
search for another seller, so you are about to agree-until you
notice that there are six more of exactly the same model in the
showroom.
By Mr. Schmidtz's argument, you should still pay. If, by some
very unlikely chance, seven customers for that model walk in
while you are at the bank, your $100 will have been well spent.
If not, you still get the car you want with no more searching,
yielding you "a very nice profit." You "cannot lose by" bribing
the salesman.
The argument is wrong because it confuses the gain from the
whole transaction (buying plus bribing) with the gain from
bribing. Unless seven customers walk in, you can get exactly
the same benefit without paying the bribe, so the $100 is a net
loss. Similarly, if you are in situation Z, you can get the gain
(the public good) for free (because others are already contrib-
uting enough to pay for it), so your contribution is a net loss.
2. Introducing Time
In trying to solve the problem presented by case five, Mr.
Schmidtz introduces time into the analysis. Instead of having
everyone make his decision at once, the individual is permitted
to wait until the last minute in order to see what everyone else
is doing. If enough has been contributed by then, he withholds
his contribution and the public good is produced anyway. If
enough has not been contributed, he concludes that his contri-
bution is needed to produce the public good. At the last min-
ute, all of the non-contributors chip in their share, and the
good is produced.
Unfortunately, that does not work. We are all in the same
situation, and we cannot all move last. The argument for wait-
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ing until the last possible moment applies with equal force to
all of the players. Everyone waits, so the fact that nobody has
contributed yet provides no information about how much will
be contributed. We all make our decisions just before the dead-
line, each in ignorance of what the rest are doing. We are back
in the simultaneous game.
Ultimately, both of Mr. Schmidtz's approaches to case five
suffer from the same sort of problem. The first approach im-
plicitly introduces decision-making under uncertainty, because
it places the individual in a situation where the question of
which action (contribute or not) is correct depends on whether
he is in situation Y or situation Z. It then tries to analyze the
situation as if no probabilities were involved ("if the individual
thinks he is in situation Y . . . ."). The second approach, by
introducing time, converts the problem from one of choosing
between two strategies (contribute or not contribute) to one of
choosing among an infinite number of strategies (contribute at
time t, contribute when other people's contributions reach an
amount M, contribute at time tj if other people's contributions
are more than N and less than P, and so on), but fails to redo
the analysis to deal with that immensely more complicated
game.26
D. Conclusion
I have gone into such detail in criticizing Mr. Schmidtz's sug-
gested private solutions to the public good problem for two
reasons. The first is that the private production of public goods
is an important issue, and the second is that I believe that an
important part of his conclusion is wrong.
That is not to say that public goods cannot be produced pri-
vately. They can be and are-in many different ways, some of
which were described by Daniel Klein in his article. Nor is it to
say that public goods can never be produced by the sort of con-
ditional contracts that Mr. Schmidtz suggests. Under some cir-
cumstances-especially where the public for a particular good
consists of only a few people-such contracts may indeed be
26. Note that in my critique, I also have not dealt with the full game implied by
introducing time into the problem. All I have done is show that Mr. Schmidtz's analysis
is inconsistent-if the optimal strategy is to wait until the last minute, as his analysis
implies, then waiting until the last minute does no good. A full analysis would be very
much more difficult, and might turn up solutions in which the public good is produced,
although I know of no reason to expect that it would do so.
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the best solution to the problem. Mr. Schmidtz's article serves a
useful function in pointing out that solution and, more gener-
ally, in reminding readers that the voluntary production of
public goods involves a problem, but not necessarily an insolu-
ble one.
Where I believe Mr. Schmidtz is wrong is in suggesting that
public good problems with large publics, specifically the prob-
lem of producing national defense, may well be soluble by such
contracts. In such situations, for reasons that I have tried to
explain, both the unanimous conditional contract and the con-
tract conditional on a sufficient amount being raised can be ex-
pected to fail. The unanimous contract fails by the defection of
one member, whether pacifist, strategic cheapskate, or enemy
agent. The CBAC fails because each citizen calculates, cor-
rectly, that he gains by contributing only if the outcome sits
exactly on the knife-edge between success and failure, and the
chance of that being the case is very nearly zero.
It may be that at some time in the future we shall succeed in
creating a society that does not depend on a coercive govern-
ment to defend us from other coercive governments. In a book
written many years ago, I discussed a variety of ways in which
that might be done.27 My conclusion then was that the unani-
mous conditional contract was not a very strong candidate. Af-
ter reading Mr. Schmidtz's article, I see no reason to revise it.
27. See D. FRIEDMAN, supra note 18, at ch. 185-97.
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